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The present article addresses the question of the ‘roots’ of trust: a debate between cognitive and
non-cognitive trust theories, ongoing since the dawn of modern theorising on trust. On the one
side, there is the assumption of conceiving trust as a learnt capacity, based on Erikson’s concept
of basic trust. On the other side is the hypothesis of innate, built-in trust. After a critical overview
of the cognitive and non-cognitive approaches, given that neither side was able to build up a de -
cisive argument, the paper proceeds to some relevant discoveries of the life sciences that serve as
proofs of the concept. Michael Polányi’s principles of marginal control and boundary conditions
help avoiding the pitfall of any reductionist determinism. The analysis results in a rejection of the
early learning concept of the cognitive approaches. Trusting is proven to be an a priori given
human faculty inscribed in our neurobiological system, but neither biologically, nor in any other
way, entirely determined. The possibility to trust is always present in the human: the trusting being.
Keywords: cognitive trust; non-cognitive trust; basic trust, innate trust, Michael Polányi
1. Introduction
Trust is without doubt one of the core determinants of individual as well as of social
existence, integrity, and (mental) health. The fact that the human is a trusting being
is among the predominant and, at the same time, most peculiar constitutive factors of
human sociality. Theorising trust has become a true ‘hot topic’ of the social sciences
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since Niklas LUHMANN’S groundbreaking work Trust and Power (1979). Despite its
popularity, there are still many serious contradictions and unresolved issues. The
present paper addresses one of the fundamental issues with the theories of (social)
trust.
The vast literature on trust can be categorised by various aspects (DELHEY &
NEWTON 2003; ÖRKÉNY & SZÉKELYI 2009). The categorisation in two major ‘schools’
is not uncommon, though; and it serves the purposes of the present article at best.
Namely, categorising into cognitive and non-cognitive groups of theory (BECKER
1996, BALÁZS 2008) that are more or less analogous to the strategic and moralistic
types of trust as described by Eric M. USLANER (2002). The ‘conceptual confusion’
(LEWIS & WEIGERT 1985, 975; MISZTAL 1996, 13.) of trust cannot only be derived
from the highly increased interest since LUHMANN’S work (1979) was published.
Most probably it stems from the unusual ‘rootlessness’ of the topic. This rootlessness
amounts to a relative absence of the classical philosophical background. Surprising
it may be but it is still a fact: the great thinkers and philosophers of the past have
rarely discussed the phenomenon of trust in a systematic and thorough fashion and
mostly sporadic, statement-like remarks can be found. To provide but an incomplete
list, Hesiod, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, or Confucius from the ancient times, the
Christian scholar Thomas Aquinas, Machiavelli of the Italian Renaissance, anglo-
phone thinkers like Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Burke, and John Stuart Mill as well as
German philosophers such as Hegel, Nietzsche, and Simmel, all paid more or less
attention to the importance of trust in various contexts1. Although their remarks on
trust are not proper conceptualisations of the phenomenon, the recurrence of the topic
can be traced throughout the ages.
The aim of the present article is to provide the reader with a possible solution to
a problem responsible for one of the most fundamental differences between the cog-
nitive and the non-cognitive theories of trust. This problem is a debate that is yet
unsolved between the assumption of trust as a learnt capacity versus the concept of
trust that is an in-built, innate component of human personality (in its individual as
well as in its social sense). This work is only a small but crucial part of a larger-scale
endeavour unto a novel understanding of the notion and concept of trust the appro-
priate elaboration of which would greatly exceed the frames of a journal article in
length as well as in format. Therefore, further details will have to be published in
future papers.
1.1. Methodological remarks
Due to the theoretical focus, the present study applies pure systematic theoretical
argumentation. As for the collection of the literature discussed in the paper, a mixed
approach was used following the suggestions of GREENHALGH and PEACOCK (2005)
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1 The discussion of their views is not the aim of the present paper. Grant DUNCAN (2019) gives a thorough
account on many of them in his recent book.
and RANDOLPH (2009) on the priority of ‘traditional’ offline methods, treating online
indexing services and searches (Web of Science, Google Scholar) as auxiliary, com-
plementary means in the efforts unto ‘saturation’2 (RANDOLPH 2009). The analysis of
the literature was done simultaneously with the collection process. The analytic
method is close to Grounded Theory approach:3 going back and forth between data
collection and the levels of analysis, constantly comparing the results, categories,
inferences, etc. to the contents of old and newly found texts.
2. Theories of trust
This chapter gives a brief overview of the two major branches of trust theories in
order to show the background to the reader, i.e. the context in which the subject of
the present article can be situated. The aim of this paper is not to give a thorough lit-
erature review, because an adequately detailed description and assessment would far
exceed the frames of a journal article. Hence, the paper provides the most important
characteristics, assumptions, and critiques of each school within the text. For the
more interested readers, two tables were created (one for each branch) where they
can find further important details.
2.1. The cognitive theories
Despite the severe critiques on its shortcomings, the cognitive / strategic approach
still holds a firm influence to date. It is perhaps due to a fallacy that it would be eas-
ier to operationalise and empirically analyse in contrast with the non-cognitive /
moralistic approaches. Trust as described by these concepts generally assumes
uncertainty and risk, knowledge- and experience-based, (object-)person-bound
rational decision or expectation, which is extremely fragile (USLANER 2002). Due to
the radical differences between the major cognitive schools that tend to sharply criti -
cise each other, it is better to discuss the different schools one by one, showing how
they build and react on each other instead of attempting to group them together by
the analytic aspects in Table 1. For a summarising view, see Table 1 below. How-
ever, the major shortcomings of the ‘softcore’ cognitivist schools are presented sep-
arately, because that is the terminal, that is to say, the final destination where the
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2 The term ‘saturation’ comes from the (qualitative) methodology of Grounded Theory. It refers in general to
a point in the data collection after which no new evidence comes to light (GLASER & STRAUSS 1967).
Although it sounds rather tempting, actual saturation can hardly ever be reached for reasons beyond the
scope of the present article, still, one has to strive for getting close to it (CHARMAZ 2006).
3 As it can be seen, the analytic approach differs from the approach of Grounded Theory due to the fact that
predefined as well as newly discovered categories were used because of the generally unconvincing posi-
tivist assumption of Grounded Theory. Namely, that any theoretical construction could be built up based
solely on and thus ‘emerging from’ the data by ruling out (or bracketing) previous knowledge (tacit or not)
on the subject. The present paper does not delve further into this – otherwise highly interesting – methodo -
logical debate, of which MÚJDRICZA and FÖLDVÁRI (2018) have recently given an overview.
rationalising cognitivist approach was able to get to by its failed attempt on incorp -
orating the irrationality of trust in its argument.
2.1.1. The early rationalists
In the less refined concepts adopting the simple economic approach of Rational
Choice Theory (DASGUPTA 1988; GOOD 1988; COLEMAN 1990; OFFE 1999), trust
appears as reasonable calculation, rational choice, assessment of costs and gains
based on pure cognition (MARKOVÁ 2004) and past experiences – a variety of uncer-
tainty-reducing, risk-handling means: a substitute for certainty (BALÁZS 2002).
SZTOMPKA (1999), too, can be listed here – even though he also appears among the
theorists of a more advanced version of the cognitive approaches – due to his woe-
fully uncritical acceptance of COLEMAN’s (1990) definition of trust as gambling, i.e.
placing a bet. The most succinct critique of this approach, as paradoxical as it may
be, actually predates them. LUHMANN (1979; 1988) had already pointed out that such
definition describes nothing but sheer calculation that leaves trust no room. Trust,
according to him (LUHMANN 1979), can only be perceived as rational from the level
of the social system as a phenomenon increasing the complexity on the systemic level
but reducing it for the individuals. 
2.1.2. Trust as ‘encapsulated interest’
From the critique of the simplifying applications of Rational Choice Theory on trust
arose a later version of an interest-driven, calculative conception of trust. Russell
HARDIN (1993; 2006) – and his followers, most notably COOK and GERBASI (2009)
and KOHN (2008) – shifted the focus from rational choice to rational expectation. It
entails that trusting would amount to having a reason to believe that being trust -
worthy in the relevant way at the relevant time will be in the trusted person’s interest,
and so the interests of the trustor are ‘encapsulated’ in the interests of the trusted.
Although HARDIN (1993; 2006) opposes the assumption that trust was a risky choice
or a choice at all, his concept still carries ‘shady manipulative’ (LAGERSPETZ 2015,
39.) overtones. In this mutually interest-driven approach to trust, the trustor takes
advantage of the desire of the trusted for good reputation. Following Philip PETTIT’s
(1995) and Olli LAGERSPETZ’ (2015) arguments, such cunning can be discovered in
Hardin’s concept that not only the trustor, but the trusted can also become a victim
of a shrewd calculation. Thus, this concept distorts the phenomenon of trust into
a cunning, manipulative, selfish relationship of interest (i.e. relationship based on
interest only), not refraining from beguiling, either. Hardin’s huge contribution to
trust research notwithstanding, his core conception seems to demonstrate a misun-
derstanding of its subject. In the words of Olli LAGERSPETZ (2015, 39.), it can be
called a ‘mutually distrustful cooperation’ at best.
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2.1.3. The ‘terminal’ of the cognitive accounts
Alas, the early theorists seem to have been unaware of two short, but important
remarks of a few authors of Social Exchange Theory (HOMANS 1961; BLAU 1964)4
on trust. Trust has a crucial role in Blau’s Social Exchange Theory, for trust is essen-
tial for reciprocity, social exchange, and stable social relations, and vice versa. He
binds trust to risk-taking in social exchange relationships. In his description, trust
emerges gradually out of pure self-interest in the course of recurring cost-benefit cal-
culations in (social) exchange situations. So far, he might be taken as a forerunner of
the early cognitivists (their apparent ignorance of Blau notwithstanding). But this
exchange is somewhat different from rational, economic exchange, for prices and
rewards cannot be exactly measured in social exchange relations. Social exchange,
this basis and derivate of trust is calculative, but not a pure calculation of advantages
– somewhere in the middle between love and calculation. This intermediacy is one
of the important remarks to be found in Social Exchange Theory, for it opens up the
possibility of irrational, or at any rate, not entirely rational trusting. HOMANS (1961,
386.) went significantly further in assuming trust as a ‘true belief’ that (at least some-
times) prevents the betrayal of others for short-term gains. Furthermore, this trust is
supported by a specific form of social capital: a moral code – which idea transcends
the cognitive concepts and foreshadows FUKUYAMA’S (1995) and USLANER’s (2002)
moralistic trust concept5.
The ‘softcore congitivists’, PUTNAM (1993; 2000), GIDDENS (1990), SZTOMPKA
(1999), and MÖLLERING (2006) diverge from the mainstream of cognitive trust the -
ories. Even LUHMANN (1979; 1988) himself refrained from perceiving trust as a sim-
ple relationship of interest, this is why he is listed here, in spite of the many self-con-
tradictions6 in the works of this pioneer of trust conceptualisation. Self-contradictory
or not, it is beyond doubt that he was against the simplistic rational choice approach,
and took a much softer stance by assuming that trust is only rational on the system-
level, on the individual, it is irrational. He labelled trust as a ‘risky undertaking’
(LUHMANN 1979, 26.), an expectation sans calculation and self-interest.
PUTNAM’s (1993; 2000) notion of trust – and HOLLIS’ (1998) concept that further
developed it – built upon the idea of ‘generalised reciprocity’7 is a solution far more
sensitive to the ‘sociality’ of trust compared to the ‘hardcore’ cognitive concepts. It
seems to be very much in line with Blau’s Social Exchange Theory as well (aside
from the lack of reference).
Its main shortcoming is also similar to the concept of Blau’s. As PUTNAM (1993)
admits it, being a combination of short-term altruism and long-term self-interest, his
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4 Other notable works on Social Exchange Theory are THIBAUT and KELLEY’s (1959) book and EMERSON’s
(1976) paper, but they do not emphasise trust as BLAU (1964) or HOMANS (1961).
5 Alas, neither refer to him.
6 This interesting topic cannot be pursued here. 
7 A term he ‘borrowed’ most likely from GOULDNER (1960) – failing to indicate the reference, unfortunately.
highly popular trust concept still remains experience-based and self-interest-driven.
The robust nature and the self-affirming, cumulative character of trust and distrust
(HIRSCHMAN 1984; GOOD 1988; DASGUPTA 1988; GAMBETTA 1988) is impossible to
explain persuasively without leaving the domain of the cognitive theories. They
remain unexplained in Putnam’s concept as well. Moreover, it does not provide any
explanation on trusting complete strangers, as neither of the cognitive approaches do.
Trust, so to say, ‘brackets’, suspends risks in GIDDENS’ (1990) and SZTOMPKA’s
(1999) approaches. Their reading suggests that not only we do not count with the
risks: we positively act as if they did not exist at all. Although HARDIN (1993) also
built the supposed as if -characteristic of trusting in his theory, GIDDENS (1990) and
SZTOMPKA (1999) put it in the focus – although SZTOMPKA (1999), as noted above,
took a major step back by utilising COLEMAN’s (1990) ‘gambling’ approach, suppos-
ing that trust was like placing a bet, an assumption that HARDIN (1993) had utterly
rejected. It is important to note that neither of these authors mention Milton Fried-
man. It is hard to assume that FRIEDMAN’s (1953) widely known as if doctrine
attempting to ‘fix’ some issues of the Rational Choice Theory-based neoclassical eco-
nomics had no influence on the as if assumption in trust theories that was also (how
surprising!) an attempt to fix the issues caused by the simplistic Rational Choice The-
ory-based ‘early’ cognitive accounts. 
2.1.4. The major shortcomings of the most developed cognitive theories
Apart from the fact that this as if concept only tells about a mimesis (imitation) of
trust rather than actual trusting, the failure of the cognitive concepts in grasping the
essence of the phenomenon in a rationalising way become ultimately clear at this
point. They are bound to let in an extremely irrational element, the so-called ‘leap
into faith’ (GIDDENS 1991, 3, 244.). Following Guido MÖLLERING (2006) – who does
a fairly worthy attempt at unifying Giddens’, Hardin’s and Sztompka’s as if
approach8 – the nature of this suspension, the ‘leap of faith’ – Giddens’ suggestion
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8 to be precise, the idea can be traced back to LEWIS and WEIGERT (1985) and Bernard WILLIAMS (1988) if
we remain within the boundaries of trust literature. Hardin just picked it up and used it – in a slightly
incoherent manner, to be true, with his encapsulated interest theory (and he mistakenly referred to GAM-
BETTA 1988 instead of Williams, too. . .). GIDDENS (1990; 1991), SZTOMPKA (1999), and MÖLLERING
(2006) only demonstrated the assumption in a fairly systematic fashion (which statement is the truest with
regard to Möllering). Not one of them – Williams included – refers to FRIEDMAN (1953), by the way,
a mistake that is intolerable on other fields of science. But such mistakes are not uncommon among the
theorists of trust. Williams failed to provide reference on Lewis and Weigert, Giddens on LUHMANN
(1979; 1988) and LEWIS and WEIGERT (1985), PUTNAM (1993; 2000) on GOULDNER (1960) and BLAU
(1964), YAMAGISHI and YAMAGISHI (1994) on BAIER (1986) and DUNN (1988), as well as MAYER and col-
leagues (1995), ROUSSEAU and colleagues (1998), and others following them since on Baier, and the list
could go on and on. It is not up to the author of this paper to judge whether this pattern is due to sheer
negligence, ignorance, or less excusable reasons, but at least a considerable share of the aforementioned
‘conceptual confusion’ of trust might indeed have been sorted out, were such mistakes avoided. We have
to give credit, though, to MÖLLERING (2006) in that he does discuss BLAU’s (1964) concept, unlike so
many other cognitive trust theorists.
was adjusted slightly to fit to KIERKEGAARD’s (1983) well-known term9 – became the
most important question for (cognitive) trust research. The problem with this
approach is, on the one hand, that although simple calculation disappears by the sus-
pension and bracketing of risks and faith would fill its place, faith, according to
TILLICH (2009), cannot be the complementary element of incomplete knowledge. On
the other hand, suspension and bracketing of risks, perils, and vulnerability amounts
to sheer ignorance or negligence – naïveté rather than trust.10
Besides the faith and the naïveté issue, the leap of faith – or hope (LI 2015) –
can be taken as a so-called ‘black box’ (again, it is suspiciously similar to where
behavioural economics based on Friedman’s as if doctrine ended up; BERG &
GIGERENZER 2010). It is rather important to emphasise this shortcoming: as this is
the furthest the conceptualisation of trust with a cognitive approach got to (already
suspiciously irrational), it sheds light on the ultimate mistake of the cognitive
school. Certain inputs (information, experiences, perils, risks, vulnerabilities, etc.)
are assumed to be processed by this black box and – no one really knows how –
trust would come out on its other side. Such black boxes as this are usually unwel-
come in sound conceptualisation efforts (BUNGE 1979). Proper theoretical deduc-
tions should be free from any ‘leaps’ or ‘holes’ in the argumentation, at least if
a simpler solution is at hand for the issue in question. And it is just the case with the
‘inputs’ for the supposed leap of faith of trust. The notion of reliance, which the
related critiques (BAIER 1986; BALÁZS 2002; HERTZBERG 1988; 2010, BERNSTEIN
2011; LAGERSPETZ 2015) thoroughly discuss, does not require a black box (BAIER
1986) to form out of these inputs. Their definition of reliance can be more or less
identified with the calculative, rationalising cognitive / strategic notion of trust, con-
sequently, any – not only the ‘leap of faith-ist’ – cognitive account of trust mistakes
reliance for trust.
Reliance (therefore the cognitive trust definitions also, or in USLANER’s (2002)
reading, strategic trust) assumes a three-place, purposive relationship, formalised as
‘A relies on B to φ’ (LAGERSPETZ 2015, 16.; see also USLANER 2002, 21). In contrast,
BAIER (1986) got rid of purposiveness in trust, even though she still saw trust as
a three-place relationship.11 However, perhaps not explicitly following this move of
Baier’s, but certainly in line with it, the true non-cognitive trust theorists – take for
example HERTZBERG (1988), BECKER (1996), or LAGERSPETZ – see trust only two-
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19 The first to introduce the assumption of a cognitive ‘leap’ in trusting was, quite unsurprisingly, LUHMANN
himself (1979). He did not use the term faith yet – his famous phrase is ‘leap into uncertainty’ (p. 33.),
wherefor information about the trusted ‘simply serve as a springboard’ (p. 33). While LEWIS and WEIGERT
(1985) refer to him, Giddens, again, fails to provide the reader with reference on either Luhmann or Lewis
and Weigert, even though the similarity between ‘leap into uncertainty’ and ‘leap into faith’ is rather unmis-
takable.
10 Moreover, basing the concept of trust on faith runs the risk of circularity if we remain on the level of the
everyday usage of these notions, given the overlapping meanings and use of the two words in the English
language (DUNCAN 2019).
11 Where purposiveness is shaken off by shifting the focus on entrusting a valued thing to someone – a motion
later to be called in question, too (JONES 1996).
place: ‘A trusts B’ (2015, 16).12 Although LAGERSPETZ’ (2015) critique is quite sharp,
his argumentation seems flawless: any reason for trusting must fall short of a justi-
fication of trust, for were trust a kind of risk-taking agency in a state of uncertainty,
it would either be redundant (if we already have assurance pertaining to the given
situation) or ill-advised (if uncertainty reigns). The inquiry attempting to find reason
for trusting itself ‘assures that my attitude can at most amount to reliance’ (LAGER-
SPETZ 2015, 134). According to these, the rational, interest-based, cognitive / stra -
tegic concepts of trust, as a matter of fact, might not even speak about trust (BECKER
1996; HERTZBERG 2010; LAGERSPETZ 2015). Rather, in certain cases, they assume
a manipulative and / or suspicious frame of mind that is, actually, the direct opposite
of trust (LAGERSPETZ 2015). The bottom line of LAGERSPETZ’ (2015) critique (based
on JONES’ (1996) account) is that since trust is with us from the start as a background
of the interpretation of the experienced facts and information, it cannot be based on
them.
To sum up: any ‘reasonable’, rational, calculative, or interest-based ‘trust’ def-
inition speaks instead about distrust, manipulation, or even in the best case, reliance.
As if trusting leads to a sheer mimesis, imitation of trust. Following the path set by
the ‘leap of faith’ paradigm and leaving the ‘black box’ of faith, bracketing, and sus-
pension untouched, naïveté emerges; if the black box is cut out with Occam’s razor,
only a refined description of reliance is left – not so much more than any other theory
of the cognitive approaches could provide us with.
By introducing these critiques, we have already arrived at the domain of the
non-cognitive concepts. Before proceeding, though, I need to note: should we accept
the ‘leap of faith’ in trust, faith would become a key element of the ‘genesis’ of trust.
An element, which, being irrational, is unexplainable in a rationalising way. Remem-
ber: the original goal was the rational explanation of trust on cognitive grounds, yet
they admit, at least, that trusting can be viewed as irrational (MÖLLERING 2006) –
arriving to the problem that BLAU’s (1964) remark had foreshadowed decades earlier.
As failed as the cognitive approaches are, the assumption of the ‘leap of faith’ indi-
cates a significant move towards the non-cognitive theories, whose starting point is
similar to this view.
2.2. The non-cognitive theories
The non-cognitive concepts (BAIER 1986; GOVIER 1993; BECKER 1996; JONES 1996;
BERNSTEIN 2011, LAGERSPETZ 1998; 2015) rooted deeply in Moral Philosophy chal-
lenge the less phenomenologically focused cognitive concepts from the start. While
the cognitive theories seem to strive for getting a grip on ‘everyday trust’, not delv-
ing deeper into phenomenological / philosophical arguments, the masterminds of the
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12 Uslaner moves another step further in his summarising work – his ‘moralistic’ trust (which is more or less
similar to the core trust concept of the non-cognitive accounts) is only one-place: ‘A trusts’ (USLANER 2002,
21. Italics in the original).
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non-cognitive concepts take a completely different approach, supported by firm
argumentative powers of their philosophical background. They address the issue of
the definition of trust by approaching it on a more general as well as ‘deeper’ philo-
sophical level. Reaching to the core, the very essence of trusting on the grounds of
Moral Philosophy is their ultimate goal (except for Lagerspetz and the Wittgensteini-
ans). In their endeavour to define trust, they even sacrifice the rationality of it.
Although this different stance might be taken as the reason for the irreconcilable dis-
crepancies between the two aspects, it is against intuition that any general, essential,
core notion of a phenomenon would be so much different from its everyday form. To
quote Philippe ROCHAT (2010, 32): ‘the basic requirements or mechanisms underlying
trust are basically the same: the same invariant and universal properties underlying
the phenomenon, however filtered they might be in their expression at various levels
of content and complexities.’ They should not be so much in contrast with each other
– rather, definition(s) of everyday trust should at least be possible to derive from
a general non-cognitive idea of it. Conversely, the non-cognitive theories culminate
in the rejection of cognitive or rational trusting.
Although different ‘schools’ of non-cognitive trust theories can be discerned, it
is better to discuss them together, given the significantly less deviations and the more
pronounced common elements in contrast with the diverse cognitive theories.
2.2.1. Key authors and schools – and the less significant
Systematic non-cognitive trust theory is rooted in Annette BAIER’s Trust and
Antitrust (1986) – an article inspired greatly by Sissela BOK’s (1978) considerations
on trust. Still, a long conceptual ‘journey’ leads from this groundbreaking work to
the ‘fully-fledged’ non-cognitivism of Jay M. Bernstein and, even more importantly,
Olli Lagerspetz. Trudi Govier and Karen Jones, who treated trust as an (affective)
attitude, were still more of forerunners than true non-cognitivists, incorporating cog-
nitive elements in their theoretic approach alongside the non-cognitive ones, but the
paramount importance of their contribution is beyond doubt. Lawrence C. Becker is
the first among the key authors to be considered as openly non-cognitivist. There
are important common elements as well as noteworthy differences in the non-cog-
nitive trust literature, the following paragraphs and Table 2 summarise the most sig-
nificant.
Some prominent names that might come to mind (Dunn, Hertzberg, Yamagishi
& Yamagishi, Fukuyama, Uslaner, etc.) are not listed among the ‘key’ authors. This
is due to the fact that these authors cannot be taken as theory-builders on their own
account, rather, they provided inspiration to others, or summarised the work of others
with few original additions. This is not to say that their works were not of exceptional
quality or importance. For instance, DUNN’s (1988) view of trust as a passion intro-
duces the assumption of trust as an unconscious, not strategic / calculative, confident
expectation of benign intentions in a free agent. But his account is slightly controver-
sial, for he views trust as a two-sided phenomenon, which can also be a strategic,
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consciously chosen policy for handling the freedom of other agents. Still, the
assumption of trust as a passion inspired many to come after him. HERTZBERG (1988;
2010) laid the foundations for Lagerspetz (both Wittgensteinian scholars), the latter
elaborated on the bases of the former’s work13. DUNCAN (2019) builds on the work
of Hertzberg and Lagerspetz in his excellent book, utilising, complementing, and
furthering their ethical understanding of trust by an especially thorough ‘observa-
tion’ of the uses of trust in the works of some of the greatest theorists over time.
Toshio and Midori Yamagishi made good use of the insights of some of the non-cog-
nitive forerunners (e.g. Baier and Dunn, alas, without references) in their definition
of general trust as ‘an expectation of goodwill and benign intent’ (YAMAGISHI &
YAMAGISHI 1994, 131–32), and they also mention the cognitive bias trust generates
in the evaluation of others. However, Toshio YAMAGISHI (2011) later opted for infor-
mation-based trust in his more recent book on trust, thus turning towards the cogni-
tive theories. It goes without saying that trust viewed as ‘complex information pro-
cessing’ (YAMAGHISHI 2011, 23. Italics in the original, emphasis removed) is rather
inconsistent with the non-cognitive theses. FUKUYAMA (1995) took an apparently
non-cognitivist stance arguing against the assumption that the moral community that
gives rise to trust would be possible to acquire through rational investment deci-
sions. It is quite important, though, that he – under the unreferenced influence of
HOMANS (1961), perhaps – shifted the emphasis on the sociality of trust, and on the
common moral norms and ethical habit trust is based on. Others, like USLANER
(2002) made good use of Fukuyama’s motion. But neither Yamagishi and Yamagishi
nor Fukuyama delve deeper into the phenomenology of trust, hence their exclusion
from the key authors. USLANER (2002) has provided us with one of the most com-
prehensive summaries on the two major schools, giving us the notions of strategic
and moralistic as well as generalised and particularised trust. His exceptional sum-
mary has but only a few original assumptions – perhaps the most significant of them
is the formalisation of (moralistic) trust only as a one-place ‘relationship’, without
any inherent need for subject or intention: ‘A trusts’ (USLANER 2002, 21. Italics in
the original). This assumption is of paramount importance that I will address in
a future paper.
2.2.2. Key elements of the non-cognitive theories
The non-cognitive branch of theories initially treated trust as a (mental) state satur ated
with a certain affective warmth (BAIER 1986; BECKER 1996; JONES 1996; BERNSTEIN
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13 Given that philosophers drawing on Wittgenstein’s philosophy generally dislike the idea of developing
philosophical theories, the lack of a ‘proper’ theory is not to be counted as a shortcoming in the case of
Hertzberg. The aim of Hertzberg and Lagerspetz was to give an account of how the notion of trust is used
in ethical life and how it may solve or create problems in that life. In this specific case, however, Lagerspetz
had such essential insights inspired by Simone Weil that seems to have taken him beyond the fixed bound-
aries of (Wittgensteinian) ethics. As implicit as this crossing of borders may be, it is nevertheless palpable,
as it will be shown below.
2011), in opposition with the bleak rationalism of Game Theorists. With the Wittgen-
steinians, Hertzberg and Lagerspetz, however, the non-cognitivist account moved
away from emotional characterisation, not by turning back to the (f)rigid rationalism
of the cognitivists but by extending the phenomenon beyond, above and below any
specific feeling or state of mind. As DUNCAN (2019) summarises, instead of striving
for a conceptualisation, Hertzberg and Lagerspetz emphasised and studied the role of
trust in human interaction. Paraphrasing Wittgenstein, LAGERSPETZ (2015, 95) argued
for the omnipresence of trust: ‘a pattern in the weave of life’. Consequently, two
major non-cognitive approaches can be outlined based on their focus: one focusing
on emotions and the other putting the emphasis on the mainly irreflective, uncon-
scious character of trusting, treating it as a ‘business-as-usual’ attitude in many cases.
It should be noted, though, that this is the result of a shift in emphasis, not an absolute
opposition or rejection of the other aspect. The authors viewing trust as an affective
attitude also recognise that trustors are usually unaware of their trusting, and Lager-
spetz does not deny the possibility of affective trusting either, he just does not allow
for limiting it to feelings, emotions, or any specific psychological state. However,
LAGERSPETZ (2015, 157), too, admits in the concluding chapter of his book that the
notion of trust is ‘closely associated with friendship and love’ – rather warm affec-
tions, indeed. 
Although the non-cognitive theories are thus not less heterogeneous than the
cognitive ones, there are some common elements in the concepts of the forerunners
(i.e. Baier, Govier, Jones) as well as of the actual non-cognitivists (i.e. Becker, Bern-
stein, Lagerspetz). Given that most of them have a strong background in (moral) phil -
osophy, they are less concerned with the ‘everyday’, superficial perception of trust,
thus avoiding the trap the cognitive accounts seem to have fallen into. In general,
their efforts enable fathoming the very essence of the phenomenon. Even though the
Wittgensteinians should not be ‘accused of’ having essentialist intents, Lagerspetz’
reading carries crucially important general insights – at least tacitly – even though he
treats trust as a situative, empirically unobservable notion. A specific common con-
ceptual element is that all of them see the trustor as someone who assumes the benevo -
lence / goodwill / benignity of the trusted. They agree that trust is something that can-
not be willed (although JONES (1996) seems a bit hesitant on the matter, see her
footnote 13), and they all argue against the cognitivist conflation of trust and reliance,
arguing for their clear distinction. 
The problem of the robust nature of trust is also a recurring topic, to which the
non-cognitive theorists found an elegant solution. JONES (1996) introduced the
assumption that trust acts as an interpretive filter, making it highly resistant to infor-
mation and counterevidence. Their interpretation is fundamentally affected by the
general trusting / distrusting disposition. BECKER (1996, 60) made the same assump-
tion implicitly asserting that trust is not damaged by lies or mistakes ‘insofar as I con-
strue them as well meant or innocent’. Bernstein and Lagerspetz further developed
Jones’ assumption. BERNSTEIN (2011) suggested that the interpretive filter of trust
could block or distort any information or evidence that might pose a threat to trust.
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LAGERSPETZ (2015) solved Jones’ issue with the ‘start-up’ problem of trust14 by shift-
ing the view from the observers’ third-person perspective to the trustor’s first-person
perspective – the only real view that shows trust in its actuality. Lagerspetz asserts that
trust is the very background of interpretation, and this is the reason why it drives and
even changes the perception and apprehension of facts and situations, which is a char-
acteristic that makes us prone to bias in favour of the trusted. Thus, ‘[t]rust (. . .) is
never forced on us by the facts alone. We must trust at first, in order then to give facts
the interpretations that we do’ (LAGERSPETZ 2015, 86. Italics added).
Of the non-cognitive accounts, only Annette BAIER (1986, 260) referred to trust
as ‘a fragile plant’, but she connected this fragility to conscious trust, asserting that
trust rarely endures awareness. As for the awareness of trust, BAIER (1986) thought
that trust can be conscious as well as unconscious: she compared it to air – we
(mostly) notice it ‘when it becomes scarce or polluted’ (p. 234). According to Karen
JONES (1996), trust can appear even if one has all the reasons not to trust. One only
becomes aware of her trusting attitude when she attempts to fight against it on the
ground of the available information. Until then, trust remains unnoticed. BERNSTEIN
(2011) and LAGERSPETZ (2015) took Baier’s assumption of awareness destroying trust
even further, developing – as Lagerspetz put it – the ‘dys-appearance’ doctrine of
trust: trust is invisible, unperceivable, and appears only posthumously, when it is
already disappeared, broken, destructed – like health. That is to say, only the absence
of trust is consciously realised.
However, the recognition of Annette Baier’s concept in general is ambiguous
(LAGERSPETZ 2015). HERTZBERG (2010), for instance, sorted it right among the cog-
nitive trust concepts. At any rate, her work signifies a transition from the cognitive
towards the non-cognitive approaches – she was a true a ‘forerunner’ of the latter.
Baier was the first to explicitly suggest that trusting attitude is driven by goodwill,
and thus she transposed the emphasis on the intimate, ‘warm’, emotive aspects of
trust (BAIER 1986; LAGERSPETZ 2015). Her definition of trust (1986, 235) as
‘accepted vulnerability to another’s possible but not expected ill will (or lack of
good will)’ seems to be mistaken though, despite the fact that the element of vulner-
ability has become remarkably popular since then, mainly in cognitive trust defin -
itions (MAYER et al. 1995; ROUSSEAU et al. 1998).15 True, though, that accepted vul-
nerability introduces the factor of risk and danger in the phenomenon of trust, which
casts a shadow of game theoretical logic and rational choice perspective on Baier’s
concept. Although her account is still far from the one of the utter rationalists,
LAGERSPETZ (2015) argues that such attitude is to be considered as a suspicious,
wary reliance. JONES (1996, 19) also points to the flaw in Baier’s concept: it is not
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14 Namely, if trust is based on an interpretation of facts which favours the trusted and trust makes us interpret
facts in a certain way, it follows that we must trust in order to trust (LAGERSPETZ 2015). It should be noted
that BLAU (1964) also struggled with a somewhat similar start-up problem but from a different aspect, unable
to sufficiently demonstrate the gradual, simultaneous emergence of trust and social exchange by assuming
their essential interdependence. MÖLLERING (2006), however, accepted Blau’s incomplete argument.
15 Yet these authors ‘forgot’ listing Baier among their bibliography entries. . .
‘sufficiently distinguished’ from relying on. LAGERSPETZ’ (2015) reasoning is quite
right that in their trustful relationships people are not likely to feel more, but rather
less vulnerable than in their relationships without trust. Lagerspetz solves the prob-
lem by showing a completely different, yet comprehensive aspect: vulnerability is
not necessarily something to avoid. Rather, in trustful relationships and true commu-
nities, we actively seek it through ‘freely offering up ourselves to each other’ (LAGER-
SPETZ 2015, 64). Instead of Baier’s (reluctantly) accepted vulnerability, LAGERSPETZ
(2015, 67. Italics in the original) recognises the exposition in trusting as an openness
of shared vulnerability, which ‘in itself is a valued piece of goods, perhaps the most
valuable ever available’.
In line with this conclusion, trust is characterised by the absence of the percep-
tion of risks, social uncertainty and vulnerability in BECKER’s (1996) ‘noncognitive
security’ theory and the ‘full-fledged non-cognitivism’ of BERNSTEIN (2011) and
LAGERSPETZ (1998; 2015). Trust thus makes one less vulnerable than not trusting
(LAGERSPETZ 2015). The perception of risks is replaced by a feeling of certainty and
security. Despite their indisputable similarity, this approach cannot be identified with
the cognitive solution of the ‘leap of faith’. Whereas this non-cognitive assumption
is characterised by an absence of the perception of vulnerability, uncertainty, and risk,
the theories linking trust to a ‘leap of faith’ are characterised by their mere suspen-
sion. By the aforementioned shift to the first-person perspective, the Lagerspetzean
non-cognitive account of trust – unlike the negligence of the cognitive accounts about
this aspect – take into account the subjective dimension of the personal nature of
trust. I call it the ‘positionality’ of trust. According to LAGERSPETZ (1998), the element
of risk taking in the act of trust can only be conceived by an external observer. But
for the trustor – it is simply not present. (Lagerspetz’ idea of trust is discussed in the
next chapter, being inseparable from his account on the formation of trust.)
Besides the common ground of the assumption of goodwill / benevolence, some
authors include several other elements among the constitutive factors of trust. The
core of trust in Karen JONES’ (1996) reading is a certain attitude of optimism charac-
terised by the trustor’s assumption of goodwill and the competence of the trusted.
Lawrence C. BECKER (1996) mentions conscientiousness and reciprocity as an ele-
ment of the sense of security accompanying trust.
2.2.3. Major shortcomings of the non-cognitive theories
Although the non-cognitive accounts seem to be conceptually better than the cogni-
tive ones, they are not flawless. Some of the shortcomings of the earlier representa-
tives were already addressed by the later non-cognitivist scholars such as Baier’s
aforementioned insufficient distinction of trust and reliance and Jones’ ‘start-up
problem’ of trust. The three-place relationship trust models of Baier, Govier, and
Jones are also suspiciously reliance-like. The accounts of Govier and Jones can also
be criticised for the inclusion of competence in their model: as BECKER (1996, 57)
writes, ‘[c]ompetence connects with the issue of reliance’. 
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The common shortcomings of all non-cognitive theories seem to be the follow-
ing. They fail to provide a satisfactory analysis on ‘everyday trust’, and cannot suffi-
ciently explain conscious trust either, perhaps because they are too preoccupied with
the demonstration of its essentially unconscious nature. Another common shortcoming
is that although they took a giant leap forward by properly distinguishing trust and
reliance, they did not pay attention to the similarly crucial demand for distinguishing
trust from naïveté. From the ethical point of view of Hertzberg and Lagerspetz, the
distinction might only depend on the ethical attitude of the person who makes the dis-
tinction, that is, who s/he blames for the trustor’s failure (alas, they did not delve
deeper into this topic). Judging the (failed) trustor’s attitude incorrect is to label them
naïve, whereas condemning the trustee for their betrayal is to prevent the immediate
transformation of trust into naïveté upon its failure. But such a solution for the prob-
lem would require a third-person position16 that seems to be inconsistent with the first-
person view that Hertzberg and Lagerspetz – quite correctly – argued for in their
descriptions of trust. As for an appropriate first-person perspective understanding of
how to distinguish trust from naïveté and thus avoid conflation or relativisation of the
two, the non-cognitive accounts have nothing to offer – not unlike the cognitive
approaches. Still, by introducing the first-person explanation of trust, they point the
direction, at any rate, in which to proceed with the issue of naïveté, as well.
3. Learnt capacity vs. built-in faculty
The issue of the formation of trust arises from the fundamental differences between
the cognitive and non-cognitive theories of trust, hence the choice of this categorisa-
tion (see the Introduction chapter) and their somewhat detailed overview above. The
debate revolves around the question of their irreconcilable assumptions: whether trust
is a learnt capacity or a ‘built-in’ human faculty.
3.1. The cognitive approach – trust as a learnt capacity
The majority of the cognitivist authors who paid attention to the formation of trust
consider it a learnt capacity based on early infantile and childhood experiences (LUH-
MANN 1979; HARDIN 1993; PUTNAM 2000). The origins of this view can be traced
back to the developmental psychologist Erik H. ERIKSON’s (1977) hypothesis of basic
trust, which fits rather well to the common assumption of the cognitive accounts that
trust were a result of past experiences and information on the trusted. In short, Erik-
son’s idea proposed a ‘blank slate’ account assuming that the most elementary form
of trusting would entirely be a result of early infantile experiences, dependent on the
quality of the relationship with the primary caregiver. This basic trust would affect
the sense of trust and trusting / mistrusting attitude throughout life. Although some
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16 In this regard it is irrelevant if the judging person is the trustor or the trusted him/herself – s/he has to take
a third-person perspective in order to make such a judgment.
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of the trust theorists, such as Luhmann and Putnam, ignore ERIKSON’s (1977) concept
on basic trust (at any rate, they do not refer to it), their views bear suspiciously great
resemblance to it. HARDIN (1993; 2006), who emphasises that trust is a learnt cap -
acity based on past experiences and it is maintained by the desire to continue the rela-
tionship (financial interests, emotional ties, reputational factors, etc.), presents
a rather crude, ‘economising’ reading of ERIKSON (1977). HARDIN (1993) suggests
that the formation of the capacity to trust depends greatly on the parents’ early age
‘investments’ (hence the ‘economisation’). He still deserves the credit for referring
to Erikson, at any rate, unlike many others.
Putnam and Hardin’s stance is quite understandable: they are strong representa-
tives of the cognitive concepts for which the experience-based concept of basic trust
comes really useful (as for Luhmann, the next paragraph will show that he was indef -
inite on the matter). It is rather surprising, though, that USLANER (2002), too, recognises
the ‘roots’ of moralistic trust (which is supposed to summarise the non-cognitive
accounts of trust) in early age experiences, whereby an optimistic world outlook and
a ‘trusting instinct’ develops. Reading Uslaner, it is clear that he sympathises with the
moralistic (non-cognitive) ‘version’ of trust, yet he builds his argumentation about its
origins upon the grounds of the Eriksonian concept of basic trust. ERIKSON’s (1977) the-
ory matches much better with the experience-based strategic (cognitive) approaches.
Still, Uslaner suggests that trust would be a result of an early learning process. Should
then the goodwill- / benevolence-expecting notion of trust of the non-cognitive con-
cepts be regarded as an (early) experience-based, ‘tacit cognitive’ phenomenon after
all? Uslaner’s motion can only be understood by noticing his twofold intention. He
tried to argue with the assumption that (generalised) trust would be possible to earn
by any ‘trustworthy’ behaviour and he attempted to provide explanation for the robust
nature of trust at the same time. ‘Trust must be learned, not earned’ (USLANER 2002,
77. Italics in the original, emphasis removed) – so his catchy conclusion goes. He
recognised, though, that by solving one problem he created another: he admitted that
his hypothesis on the formation of trust is not a strong claim. The issue that he did not
recognise, however, is that by using Erikson’s concept to explain the robust nature of
generalised, moralistic (i.e. non-cognitive) trust, he set its ‘roots’ into experiences, as
it were. Consequently, in essence, he made trust similar to particularised, strategic (i.e.
cognitive) trust. The difference between them (and thus between cognitive and non-
cognitive trust) would only be in the time of the experiences earned. It follows that the
earlier the basis experiences of actual trust were, the more generalised / moralistic /
non-cognitive it would be. The two, ostensibly irreconcilable types of trust might not
be that different after all, if his hypothesis is correct.
3.2. The non-cognitivist account – trust as a built-in faculty
But the main problem is not yet solved, for the fact that the cognitivists and Uslaner
seem to have ignored should not be forgotten: that is, the concept of basic trust has
received serious critiques since Erikson put forward his hypothesis. Even LUHMANN
THE ROOTS OF TRUST 125
EJMH 14:1, June 2019
(1979) stated at the beginning of his work that if the exclusive alternatives to trust are
chaos and paralysing fear, the capacity to trust is a natural faculty of the human
being. With this he suggested the a priori given nature of trust, though later, contra-
dicting himself, he also assumed early childhood learning. A partial critique of Erik-
son’s concept is Philippe ROCHAT’s17 more recent (2010) psychological study in
which the author opposes the assumption of learnt basic trust. ROCHAT (2010, 37)
suggests that trust belongs to ‘pre-adapted action systems’ of neonates that already
exist at birth. Neonates are ‘endowed’ with it, although this innate trust goes through
rapid changes depending on external effects and acquired experiences between ages
0 and 5 (he divides the early development of trust in 6 different phases or levels).
Rochat considers trust as a biologically determined (but by no means reflex-like!),
inborn, ‘built-in’ phenomenon but not unchanging and unalterable, of course.
The non-cognitive concepts argue similarly. Annette BAIER declared that a cer-
tain innate but fragile trust seems necessary in any creature who is initially nourished
by another in contrast with the ‘ultra-Hobbist child’ (1986, 241) who is so fearful that
she rejects even maternal nursing. Zoltán BALÁZS (2002) also argued that trust is
present in us from the first moment of our existence. The conclusion of Olli LAGER-
SPETZ (2015, 86) at the end of his argument on the background-characteristic of trust
is that trust ‘is with us from the start’. Lagerspetz’ assumption is very much in unison
with ROCHAT’s (2010) implicit trust inscribed in neonates. Alas, other significant fig-
ures of the non-cognitivist theories – such as Karen JONES (1996) and Lawrence C.
BECKER (1996) – did not discuss the issue of the formation of trust, although BECKER
(1996, 51–52) emphasised the importance of this ‘line of inquiry’, implying that non-
cognitive trust might be ‘partly hardwired’, even assuming the possibility of genet -
ically encoded trust.18
However, LAGERSPETZ pays special attention to the issue of basic trust, devoting
the entire final chapter of his book Trust, Ethics and Human Reason (2015) to this
topic. Due to its paramount importance, his concept is reviewed in the subsequent
paragraphs in more detail than the ones of others, which are outlined previously in
this paper. He starts from the generally accepted premise that ‘some form of gener-
alized trust is necessary for human life and even sanity to prevail’ (LAGERSPETZ 2015,
131). He goes further, asserting that ‘[w]e need to believe in the essential continuity
of the social life around us, and we must act on the assumption that people generally
are not hostile or out to deceive us’ (LAGERSPETZ 2015, 131). In general, he provides
an alternative argument for the claims that view basic trust essentially groundless:
innate, primordial – a self-evident sense. This self-evident sense of trust is a ‘natural
substratum for the subsequent growth of more reflexive approaches to the world’
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17 Neither Erikson nor Rochat are counted among the key theorists of trust in the present paper for they discuss
trust only from the viewpoint of developmental psychology.
18 The latter assumption has become quite popular since then, one of the most recent studies based on this
approach is NISHINA and colleagues’ (2018) research conducted under none other than the late trust theorist
Toshio Yamagishi’s supervision (he passed away on 8. May 2018 – let us remember him by mentioning his
last efforts in the service of trust research).
(LAGERSPETZ 2015, 131). Instead of focusing on the ontological / empirical question
of the existence of basic trust, LAGERSPETZ (2015, 153. Italics in the original) concep-
tualises ‘essential features’ of trust, using Simone Weil’s and K. E. Løgstrup’s works
in the demonstration of the concept of basic trust as a possible descriptor of ‘the
human ethical condition’.
Lagerspetz questions the conceptions considering trust as a response for some
general-level scepticism (BERNSTEIN 2011; GIDDENS 1990; 1991) based on WITTGEN-
STEIN’s On Certainty (1969). As WITTGENSTEIN (1969, §160. Italics in the original)
noted with respect to childhood learning: ‘[d]oubt comes after belief’, so concludes
LAGERSPETZ (2015) – summarising Wittgenstein’s view on the matter – that the fac-
ulty to trust should also come ‘after belief’. ‘The child learns by believing the adult’
– WITTGENSTEIN (1969, §160.) thus turned the table, and showed that early learning
is dependent on believing the adult: in this sense, trusting the adult. It follows that it
is learning that would be impossible without trust, not the other way around. Further-
more, according to LAGERSPETZ (2015), critical faculties would not be possible to
develop if the child was not characterised at the start by not-doubting. However,
LAGERSPETZ (2015) opposes Wittgenstein somewhat by arguing that in a realistic situ -
ation babies do not trust adults or their parents instantly, from the very start of their
existence. Children’s (trust-like) attitude towards their parents should only be con-
ceived as ‘fully fledged’ believing if the children are already capable of disbelieving,
ignoring, and opposing them. Hence, as true as the assumption of trust being present
from the earliest infancy may be, it is just as possible that ‘we should perhaps not say
that babies trust their parents from the very start but only that they do not distrust
them’ (LAGERSPETZ 2015, 146. Italics in the original.) 
At this point, it seems that Olli Lagerspetz is not intent on deciding the debate
between the approaches assuming the innate, a priori built-in nature of basic trust
and the tabula rasa (‘blank slate’) concepts. But shortly afterwards, he states that
‘[a]n infant who did not start life with a basically trustful attitude towards those
around him (. . .) would be considered abnormal’ (LAGERSPETZ 2015, 146). In add -
ition, he thinks that in early childhood, the opposite of trust is not doubt, distrust, or
suspicion but fear. Consequently, the lack of basic trusting attitude in an infant would
reveal an overwhelming fearfulness. This, essentially, is analogous to Annette
BAIER’s (1986) above-mentioned ‘ultra-Hobbist child’ image, who, albeit, is not dis-
trustful, s/he ‘just’ happens to be in the state of lack of trust and fearfulness.
Consequently, even though Lagerspetz himself did not intend to provide an
empirical solution, the ontological priority of trust seems to be evident in contrast
with distrust19 – Lagerspetz refers to this particular ontological ‘imbalance’ in writing
about the asymmetry in human growth between trust and distrust. The essentials and
the final conclusion of LAGERSPETZ’ argument is included in his earlier book as well
(1998). He built his reasoning upon the well-known words of Simone WEIL:
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19 Further particulars on the ontological priority of trust over distrust can be found in Robert STERN’s (2017)
essay, who gives an exhaustive account on Løgstrup’s concept of basic trust.
At the bottom of the heart of every human being, from earliest infancy until the tomb, there
is something that goes on invincibly expecting, in spite of all experience of crimes commit-
ted, suffered, and witnessed, that good and not evil will be done to him. It is this above all
that is sacred in every human being.20
(1957, 13; 2005, 71)
This quote serves as a foundation for the trust concept of Lagerspetz: the core
of trust is Weil’s good-expecting disposition ever-present in the human heart. By
combining this good-expecting attitude with LØGSTRUP’s (1997) radical account on
the a priori given trust, LAGERSPETZ (1998; 2015) identifies it to be behind Løgstrup’s
‘tacit demand’ of trust. The combination of Weil and Løgstrup’s ideas results in
Lagerspetz’ own reading of trust as tacit demand. There are two main reasons for the
tacitness of this demand. Firstly, its hidden, empirically unobservable characteristic.
Secondly, the trusting individual typically does not utter or express it in any way, she
herself may not even be aware of it (it is also consistent with the assumption of the
unperceivable character of trust). Trust – as LAGERSPETZ (2015) argues citing
Løgstrup’s related lines in his own translation (for the ‘official’ English translation,
see LØGSTRUP 1997, 18) – is inescapable and given, not a matter of any arbitrary or
capricious choice.
Simone Weil and Lagerspetz consider the capacity to assume good – the opti-
mistic attitude that USLANER (2002) considers the basis of trust and views as
a capacity learnt in early infancy – a pre-inherent phenomenon ‘at the bottom of
the human heart’ that no experience can extinguish. Weil’s insightful statement, if
we take the liberty of relating it to trust in the light of the non-cognitive interpret -
ations of trust is consonant with ROCHAT’s (2010) above-mentioned concept of
built-in trust. According to these claims, trust cannot be a learnt, experience-based
capacity – it is rather a natural, a priori given, unending component of human per-
sonality.
It must be noted here that Lagerspetz made perfectly clear that he does not
imply (at least not intentionally) any essentialist understanding of trust or any empir-
ical or psychological theory of human states of mind, and reads Weil accordingly. His
idea of basic trust is an attempt to establish an ethical perspective through which
human life can be viewed – trust included. LAGERSPETZ used Weil’s description as
a ‘point of comparison’ whose value ‘depends on the extent to which it can help us
organize our [ethical] understanding of existing situations’ (2015, 150). 
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20 I made an alternative translation using the French original (WEIL 1957) and the English translation (WEIL
2005), for the latter is imprecise at key places. The word indomitably in the English translation does not
carry the same meaning as invinciblement in the original French, so I changed it to invincibly. The transla-
tion of the French word malgré to in the teeth of is also misleading. This option might be more poetic, but
it blurs and significantly changes the meaning of the original by emphasising the seriousness of the experi-
ences mentioned in the passage instead of the original meaning in spite of or despite. Therefore, I replaced
in the teeth of with in spite of that serves the purposes of an accurate translation and the researcher’s interest
much better.
Weil’s claim on the expectation of goodness in the depths of every human
heart, however, has another possible interpretation. Indeed, the passage has no
empirical value – she did not ask each and every person about this, as Lagerspetz
argues. By all means, the expectation of goodness has the ethical value that Lager-
spetz emphasises. Still, WEIL’s (2005) major point cannot be dismissed: she clearly
stresses the good-expecting characteristic of every human being, ‘from earliest
infancy until the tomb’. It is not an empirical observation but a declaration of
human reality, that is, an anthropo-ontological statement. Now, it may seem that
she talks about Sein rather than Sollen (WEBER 2012) – ontology and (human)
exist ence instead of ethics and normativity. Ontology, in Wittgenstein’s account,
precedes the ethical,21 but given that Weil talks about goodness, an inherently eth-
ical notion, her statement seems to represent a pre- or sub-analytic reality of human
life wherein Sein and Sollen are not (yet) divided: in which anthropo-ontological
existence and ethical value coincide. The coincidence of ethics and ontology can
also be grasped in her view of the Good ‘steering’ the world (FINCH 1999). Further-
more, this coincidence of existence and value enables the ethical value to be an
‘unchoice’.22
Wittgenstein claimed the lack of relation of good (values) and the world (facts)
(FINCH 1971). WITTGENSTEIN (1961, 79e-80e) proposed that ‘[g]ood and evil only
enter through the subject’, and ‘[w]hat is good and evil is essentially the I’, the
‘bearer of ethics’. As FINCH (1999, 15) wrote on Weil’s ineradicable expectation of
goodness, it is one of the two ‘tiny points’ that links the utterly fragile human beings
to other things – and both points are impersonal. In this regard, Wittgenstein’s
account is irreconcilable with Weil’s.23
The inherently onto-ethical nature of Weil’s claim is ‘inescapable’ (just as trust
is). By utilising it as a core element, this onto-ethical characteristic pervades and
shines through Lagerspetz’ strictly ethically aimed idea of trust as a tacit demand of
goodness, despite the paradigmatically ethical framework of his dealing with the
issue. Even though Lagerspetz never intended to step over the boundaries of ethics,
his description of basic trust carries tacit essentialist overtones, just as ‘Weil’s insist -
ence on the (. . .) primordial character of our reactions to human beings’ (LAGERSPETZ
2015, 151). He also admits the ontological nature of the reactions Weil described:
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21 The late expert of Wittgenstein as well as Weil’s philosophy, Henry LeRoy FINCH (1971) gave an exhaustive
analysis of Wittgenstein’s separation of facts and values.
22 And on the one hand, one might also suspect it to be the very factor that is responsible for (basic) trust’s
inescapable and rationally unchosen character as well. On the other hand, this coincidence of what is (Sein)
and what ought to be (Sollen) enables Weil to safely assume the sacredness of this essential human expect -
ation of goodness.
23 FINCH also shows in his remark on Weil’s view on rights that a demand (of fairness) arising from person-
ality would necessarily be ‘connected with calculation, possessiveness, and envy’ (1999, 15). It follows
that Weil’s expectation of goodness cannot be personal / subjective, thus cannot only be ethical in the
Wittgensteinian sense. For if it could be, it would be impossible to build Lagerspetz’ notion of (basic)
trust on it, because calculation only results in reliance or distrust, as the non-cognitivists (Lagerspetz
included) argue.
‘These are natural responses, seeds from which ethical concepts (. . .) subsequently
develop (2015, 151. Italics added)’.24
There is but one glitch: however elegant the argument of Lagerspetz and Rochat
might be, however catching Weil’s insight is, however rational and reasonable
Uslaner’s, Putnam’s, and Erikson’s reasoning sounds, none of them provided any true
proofs of their concept. To be fair, the strictly ethical analysis of Lagerspetz would
not require any such proofs, still, it makes sense to call for empirically observable
indicators of his tacitly onto-ethical claim. Lagerspetz demonstrated basic trust on
the level of human ethics – the attempt to find its equivalent on the sub-ethical and
subhuman level might be a necessary validation of the aforementioned tacit claims.
At this point, one may recall ROCHAT’s (2010) remark on built-in trust being biologic -
ally determined. He leaves this remark without elaborating on it – the subsequent
chapters of the present paper discuss this topic.
3.3. The role of oxytocin
According to Mario BUNGE (1979), the universe is a world of interconnected systems.
Bunge gives an exhaustive account on these systems, first of which is the physical-
chemical system encompassing particles from the atoms to biomolecules, such as the
DNA. The biological system (or the ‘living things’) emerges from the physical-chem-
ical system by self-assembly. There are different biotic levels: the cells, components
of an organism, an organism, population, ecosystem, and the biosphere. BUNGE
claims that in this hierarchy, every level has spontaneously emerged, ‘self-assembled
from things at the proceeding level’ (1979, 85), prebiotic or biotic. The human organ-
ism, together with its brain (a neural system) is a sub-system of the social system and
is affected by exogenous influences besides the endogenous influences of its bio -
logic al system. The social system with its (artificial) subsystems – the economical,
the cultural, and the political system – is thus based on and emerges in a natural evo-
lutionary process from the physical-chemical, the biological, and the psychological
systems, interwoven with environmental influences. 
A remark has to be made here. Although Bunge is aware of Michael POLÁNYI’s
1968 paper ‘Life’s Irreducible Structure’, he seems to have missed some important
points of it (only refers to it while discussing the reductionist, goal-directed ‘machin-
ism’ of biology), most probably because of his rigid (‘emergentist’ / ‘systemist’)
materialist stance. He rejected, though, sheer biological determinism and promoted
the ‘nature and nurture’ view of human behaviour. Still, POLÁNYI’s (1968) argumen-
tation is more elegant in this regard, whose emergentism is different from Bunge’s
emergentist materialism. One fundamental difference between the two is that Bunge
allowed only for an ultimately closed system, whereas Polányi built his theory on
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24 The question arises: could Lagerspetz have avoided such essentialist overtones? If the unchosen, onto-eth-
ical expectation of goodness is taken out of the idea of Lagerspetzean basic trust, it weakens the concept
critically. Therefore, Weil’s claim is essential, not only in a general sense, but regarding Lagerspetz’ idea
as well.
a more flexible, stable open-system approach (PAKSI 2009). His moderate materialist
reductionism notwithstanding, Bunge’s heroic endeavour shows the benefits of inte-
grating the insights of seemingly distant fields of science, in this case the life sciences
and the social sciences. If treated carefully, discoveries of the life sciences can enrich
the understanding of social phenomena.
3.3.1. Nature versus nurture – a few remarks
The ‘nature versus nurture’ debate has been around since the very dawn of systematic
human thought: it can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle. On the origins of human
knowledge, Plato claimed that humans are born with innate concepts, i.e. the universal
forms (representing the ‘nature’ side), whereas ARISTOTLE proposed in De Anima (2016)
that knowledge and behaviour come from experiences, and human reason is a clean
tablet, on which nothing is written (i.e. tabula rasa, fitting to the ‘nurture’ accounts).
Their views of women’s role in society seem a bit controversial, though: PLATO argued
in The Republic (2000) that, provided they get the same education (i.e. ‘nurture’),
women and men are equally capable of performing the role of guardians in the ideal
society, whereas ARISTOTLE stated in Politics (1998) that women are inferior to men by
nature. Without delving further into the details of this ever-present debate, it has to be
made clear that it later developed into a huge cross-disciplinary argument involving
philosophy, biology, psychology, sociology, and so on. In the present days, extremist
ideas promoting either biological determinism on the nature side (e.g. genes, neuro -
endocrine systems, etc.) or a ‘blank slate’ nurture approach of environmental influences
(e.g. socialisation) are both considered as incorrect. The predominant view is that
human behaviour in general arise from the complex interplay of endogenous (biologic -
al, genetic) as well as exogenous (environmental, social, etc.) influences (BOUCHARD
1994; CACIOPPO et al. 2000; JOHNSON 2007; RIEDL & JAVOR 2012). A proper discussion
of the nature vs. nurture debate would fill books, and is not the subject of the present
paper, therefore I cannot pursue this matter further. It is important to see, however, that
the question of the (metaphorical) roots of trust, as every other aspect of human agency,
is inextricably linked to and situated in this most ancient of debates.
3.3.2. Oxytocin and trust
After these introductory remarks, let us get to the point. The answer for the question
of how trust can be ‘inscribed’ in the biological system can be found in a life sciences
discovery on certain hormonal processes. That is, human beings have not only the
better-known cortisol-based hormonal response to stress, but also the less-known
oxytocin-based response.25 If one looks at the constantly growing body of literature
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25 It should be noted that the aim of the following passages is not to provide a full account on the matter from
a life sciences aspect. The inter-disciplinary approach is used only for the sake of deciding the question of
learnt versus innate trust. If interested in further details, see for instance RIEDL and JAVOR’s (2012) excep-
tionally thorough literature review.
of the life sciences on human cooperative behaviour, s/he might get the impression
that the question on the origins of trust is an already answered one, not worthy of
further discussion. Such a rash judgment would miss the fact that no satisfactory
analysis integrates the issues and debates of the ‘high’ theoretical level with the
‘low-level’ biological findings, thus resolving the debate of cognitive versus non-
cognitive trust. The aim of the subsequent passages is just that: to announce, finally,
an indisputable ‘winner’ based on the firm facts instead of – in certain cases quite
inapt – reasoning.
Although there are studies concluding that the propensity to socially oriented
action is wired in the human being even before birth (CASTIELLO et al. 2010,
analysing the movements of twin foetuses), suggesting the prenatal nature of trust,
such a hypothesis would be a too long shot yet. Instead, the present paper sticks to
the less obscure role of oxytocin in human cooperation, especially in trusting behav-
iour. In contrast with the cortisol-based fight-or-flight stress response, which entails
aggressive and anti-social behaviour among others, the oxytocin-based tend and
befriend stress response reduces anxiety and fear, promotes cooperation and trust, and
induces prosocial behaviour (TAYLOR et al. 2000; KIRSCH et al. 2005; KOSFELD et al.
2005; ZAK et al. 2005; TAYLOR 2006; KRUEGER et al. 2007; BAUMGARTNER et al. 2008;
VARGA 2009; BUCHANAN & PRESTON 2014; MCGONIGAL 2015) under stress condi-
tions characterised by acute threat (BUCHANAN & PRESTON 2014). In spite of the com-
mon stereotype (as hypothesised by TAYLOR (2006), too), it is not only true for
females but also for males. In the study of VON DAWANS and colleagues (2012), acute
stress conditions increased prosocial behaviour in men such as trust, trustworthiness,
and sharing. According to BUCHANAN and PRESTON, this result ‘[undermines] the
assumption that stressed men would revert to anti-social “fight-or-flight” responses
and support[s] the possibility of prosocial effects’ (2014, 2). Consequently, human
beings are proven to be equipped with the ability to react in a trusting manner even
at the biological level, regardless of sex. That is to say, the ability to react even to
stressful situations prosocially and trusting is built-in the human neurobiological sys-
tem. Humans are born with the possibility of oxytocin-based response. This fact
alone proves the innate nature of trust and denies the early learning hypothesis at the
same time. The present paper does not assume, though, that the propensity to trust
could not change after birth. To avoid misunderstanding, it is important to emphasise
that the dichotomy is not about whether (early) learning matters or not with respect
to trust. The validation of the innate nature of the possibility to trust is not to be mis-
taken for a total denial of the importance and role of early learning. What it denies is
the popular blank slate account of Erikson, the cognitive theories, and Uslaner,
namely, that trust would only be a learnt faculty. Consequently, the argumentation
proves not more and not less that the capacity to trust is a priori given, built in the
human hormonal system, and not solely a (by-)product of learning processes. It is
rather in line with the conclusions of RIEDL and JAVOR’s (2012) literature review on
the biological perspective of trust research, taking into account not only the hor-
monal, but also the genetic as well as brain level in their analysis.
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3.3.3. Michael Polányi and the limits of the biological explanation
The proof of ROCHAT’s (2010) above-cited biological ‘manifestation’ of trust is found,
validating the non-cognitive approach on firm factual grounds. At this point, the
other, not less important part of Rochat’s claim has to be examined: trust being bio-
logically determined. Many seem to agree with this assumption, such as Paul ZAK
(2011) – who goes as far as identifying the molecule of trust, empathy, and morality
in oxytocin –, Kelly MCGONIGAL (2015), or the approach (KIRSCH et al. 2005; KOS-
FELD et al. 2005; BAUMGARTNER et al. 2008, VAN IJZENDOORN & BAKERMANS-KRA-
NENBURG 2011) presenting external oxytocin administration as a potential means of
trust stimulation, and so on.
However, these approaches simplify the highly complex phenomenon of trust.
In the recent years, concerning trust, many (CACIOPPO et al. 2000; RIEDL & JAVOR
2012), warn against such a simplification of biological determinism. The aforemen-
tioned conclusions of the nature versus nurture debate also suggest that true trust can-
not be induced merely by meddling with the biological-hormonal system. In line with
these conclusions, trust, as all other aspects of human agency, is under the effect of
a highly complex interplay of biological, psychological, social, cultural, etc. factors.
For the purposes of the present paper, Michael POLÁNYI’s (1966) analysis on the prin-
ciple of marginal control and the boundary conditions of a system provides the
means for a firm argument against biological determinism without a long adventure
on the fields of the nature versus nurture debate. The introduction of Polányi’s theory
in this argument has another additional value: he gives a rather elegant and simple,
but hardly refutable account against determinisms of any kind – even against ‘inte-
grative determinism’ suggesting that trust is a result of ‘only’ the complex interplay
of biological and social etc. factors. For example, TSUR’s (2012) paper demonstrates
the relevance of Polányi’s theory in contemporary debates against biological-neuro-
logical determinism.
According to Polányi’s principle, the lower levels of operation (of reality)
impose restrictions on the higher levels but they do not determine the entirety of these
upper levels, for their special and unique organising principles cannot be derived
from the laws governing the particulars constituent of the lower levels. The organis-
ing principles of the upper levels specify the boundary conditions of the system and
the control these principles exercise over the particulars forming the lower levels is
marginal control. As vocabulary cannot be derived from phonetics, grammar from
vocabulary, good style from grammar, neither gives good style the content of a liter-
ary work. According to Richard ALLEN, Polányi argues against objectivist reduction-
ism by explaining that ‘a comprehensive entity, or complex performance, exists on
at least two levels: that of its subsidiary details and that of the entity or performance
itself into which they are organised’ (1990, 59–60). Now, it is quite indisputable that
trust is a complex performance of a comprehensive entity. By understanding this sys-
tem of dual control, as ALLEN (1990) calls it, the reason can also be understood why
trust cannot be fully determined by hormonal (or cognitive) functions.
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Take trust as the content and the mode of action of oxytocin as the grammar (the
oxytocin molecule is similar to phonetics in this comparison). It is clear from this
example that the phenomenon of trust cannot be understood (or created) on the sole
basis of oxytocin effects on human brain and behaviour, as neither can a literary work
be understood or created on the basis of a mere analysis of its grammar and phonet-
ics. According to POLÁNYI (1966, 41), ‘we can see this principle of marginal control
operating also in the hierarchy of biotic levels. (. . .) [T]he principle of marginality 
(. . .) is present alike in artifacts, like machines; in human performances, like speech;
and in living functions at all levels.’ Polányi marks the predominant view of the
biolo gists claiming that all manifestations of life and living functions are possible to
be explained from the laws of inanimate nature a ‘patent nonsense’ (POLANYI 1966,
37). He recognised that sentience – ‘the most striking feature of our existence’
(POLANYI 1966, 37) – as an upper level is based directly or indirectly on the ‘gover-
nors’ of the lower levels, i.e. laws of physics and chemistry as well, but not purely on
them. These laws do not include any conception of sentience. Therefore, ‘any system
wholly determined by these laws must be insentient. It may be in the interest of sci-
ence to turn a blind eye on this central fact of the universe, but it is certainly not in
the interest of truth’ (POLANYI 1966, 37–38). As Harry PROSCH summarises, since
Polányi’s understanding of the notion that being exists in hierarchical levels, ‘[w]e
are no longer faced with the hopeless task of attempting to explain sentience by con-
cepts taken from the insentient’ (1986, 131). It is ‘rooted in and dependent for their
existence upon a lower, insentient level’ (PROSCH 1986, 131), but it also structures
the lower, insentient level. Sentience is not reducible to the physical level. It is con-
trolled by the insentient, it might even be evoked by the insentient, but is not deter-
mined by the insentient. Therefore, it is uncaused (PROSCH 1986).
Humans are, no doubt, among the most developed sentient beings, and trust can
be viewed as a sentiment. Trust, at least in certain cases, is something we feel, even
if most of the time, according to the non-cognitive approaches (and especially to the
‘business-as-usual’ accounts of Hertzberg and Lagerspetz), we do not even recognise
its presence. Consequently, it is impossible to derive the whole complex of the sen-
timent of trust only from the laws of the hormonal function of oxytocin, which is not
even fully discovered yet, by the way. Following Polányi’s decisive logic, such sys-
tem would necessarily be ‘trustless’. All of the interpretive values emphasised by the
non-cognitive trust theories should be absent from such a system. And if affective
trust cannot be fully derived from sheer ‘sub-sentient’ neurohormonal processes, nei-
ther can be the phenomenon of the unconscious, default trusting attitude of the non-
cognitivists, especially Hertzberg and Lagerspetz – the above-quoted pattern in the
weave of human life. Accordingly, without the marginal control of the upper levels,
real trusting attitude, let alone morality or prosperous society (as ZAK 2011 mis -
takenly envisages) is theoretically impossible to stem from oxytocin alone. Oxytocin-
based hormonal reactions cannot be responsible for the entire human phenomenon
called trust, as a word does not come out of sounds arranged randomly after one
another or a sentence out of a tangled mix of words and so on (POLANYI 1966). In
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POLÁNYI’s words: ‘nothing that ought to be, can be determined by knowing what is’
(1966, 41. Italics in the original).26 Trust is, as TSUR summarises Polányi’s principles,
subjected to ‘bottom-up unpredictability’ (2012, 434).
To sum up: given that a lower level can never subject the boundary conditions
set by an upper level completely under its control (POLANYI 1966), neither can trust
be fully determined by oxytocin, although – as it follows from Polányi’s above-
described principles – trust must undoubtedly obey its biological laws, however
obscure and undiscovered these ‘laws’ may yet be. They do not alone govern human
trust, but ignoring them would be a mistake. The ambiguous findings on the effect of
oxytocin on aggression (KIRSCH et al. 2005), and the failure of certain experiments
designed to generate trust by external oxytocin administration (SHAMAY-TSOORY et al.
2009; DECLERCK et al. 2010; BARTZ et al. 2011) clearly illustrate that trust cannot be
truly ‘triggered’ by any ill-considered meddling with human biochemistry. In the
same way, the lower level, i.e. the function of oxytocin is necessarily subjected at its
boundaries to a marginal control determined by the upper level, the (sentient) human
being. Furthermore, these findings are also true for any ‘integrative determinism’ 
– no endogenous (internal, biological) or exogenous (external, e.g. social) effect of
a ‘closed system of worlds’ can account for the boundaries.
The research showing the trust-evoking effect of oxytocin-based stress response
verifies the hypothesis of the a priori inherent nature of our propensity to trust with
an important note: they indicate a plausibility, not a necessity. The hypothesis of bio-
logically determined trust is mistaken, and so is the assumption that trust would be
a mere derivate of a learning / socialisation process, however early it may be.
Before proceeding to the next chapter, let me have one final remark. The same
argument as the one that was just set forth would be possible to hold for the early
learning theories as well as the theories assuming that trust is rooted in experiences
and is possible to be derived from them in some (yet obscure) way – see the ‘leap of
faith’ approaches. No lower-level experience can account entirely for the upper-level
function of trust, even if we view trust as a choice or a decision. POLÁNYI (1975, 176)
is quite clear on the matter that even choices (and decisions, see PROSCH 1986) are
‘ “uncaused”, in the sense that there is nothing (. . .) that determines or necessitates
that they become precisely what they do become.’ As shown above, it is the case with
trust, too. The inputs assumed by the cognitive theories to be the ‘causes’ of trust
would result in mere reliance without requiring any obscure ‘leaps’ of faith. It is not
to say that experiences and other cognitive processes cannot at all affect our trusting.
In this regard, non-cognitive theories might be mistaken (it might be the subject of
a future article).27 But any attempt on basing trust only on cognitive processes is just
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26 Max WEBER (2012) gave an exhaustive explanation on the difference between ‘what is’ and ‘what should
be’ in his well-known 1904 study on the objectivity of social science.
27 For instance, according to ALLEN’s reading of Polányi, by studying the lower levels we can acquire know -
ledge of the limits of trust, too, ‘within which it operates or lives, and of how it can break down, go wrong,
become ill or die. By being embodied in matter, (. . .) the functioning of organisms, and the thoughts and
actions of minds, are put at risk by the lower levels on which they depend’ (1990, 63). Experiences can thus 
as mistaken as the assumption that trusting would be determined by neurobiological
processes alone. The same argument holds for the external influences of socialisation
and culture, too. Therefore, keeping these in mind, together with Polányi’s above-
cited words on the relationship of the known and the existing, any integrative hypoth-
esis assuming that trust would be the ‘sole’ outcome of the obscure interplay of bio-
logical, cognitive, and social factors must be rejected. No determinism is allowed,
however nuanced and elaborate it might be. An integrative theory of trust is needed
instead, which reconciles cognitive and non-cognitive approaches by building on
their advantages and getting rid of their disadvantages, and introducing factors that
help avoiding determinism. Such a task cannot be carried out without finding a novel
aspect, for the existing frameworks seem to lack the potential.
4. Directions for future research
Although it is a cliché but it is true: rebuilding a collapsed building must start from
the foundations. Tiny, sometimes confusing but important signs across the trust litera -
ture mark the way. To mention but a few, ERIKSON (1977), LUHMANN (1979), BAIER
(1986), DUNN (1988), GOOD (1988), GIDDENS (1990), YAMAGISHI and YAMAGISHI
(1994), SZTOMPKA (1999), MARKOVÁ (2004), BAUMAN (2006), MARKOVÁ and col-
leagues (2006), and KOHN (2008) all give us more or less (usually less) detailed
pointers on the dynamic relationship of trust and fear / anxiety. The neurological lit-
erature on trust gives the same impression. Is it not suspicious that the above-dis-
cussed oxytocin-based stress-response is an alternative to the cortisol-based, which
is accompanied by fear, anxiety, and anti-social behaviour? My guess is that it is most
suspicious, indeed.
Anthony GIDDENS (1991), in a few short passages that no trust theorist seems to
have taken notice of so far, drew attention to Paul TILLICH’s (1952) ontology of
courage. In this all-important writing28, Tillich was concerned with the problem of
how the human being deals with existential anxiety: the threat of mortality and non-
being. Although Giddens misunderstood Tillich in assuming that trust is the source
of Tillich’s courage to be, future trust research has to start with investigating the fun-
damental existential questions of being and nonbeing with a special attention to exist -
ential (death) anxiety (the unavoidable and unending component of human life) and
its relationship with trust. This path can help us make sense of such vague and
unelaborate assumptions as MÖLLERING’s (2006; 2013) who suspects that trust can
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28 set the limits of trust. Although they alone cannot account for trust, knowing of their corruption can help us
understand the breach of trust (not forgetting the experience-resistant nature of real trust). Perhaps the non-
cognitive theories are not so far off by assuming that becoming aware of trust and the possible reasons (or
lack of reasons) thereof might be a token of the fact that our trusting is already corrupted in a way or another
. . . This issue, like many others, also falls out of the scope of the present paper, but I hope I will be able to
elaborate it in a future article.
28 It served, for instance, as a major basis of such highly regarded psychological works as YALOM’S well-
known Existential Psychotherapy (1980).
form in spite of / despite insufficient information or knowledge – but neither he nor
anyone else has ever pursued this suspicion far enough.
MÖLLERING’s (2006, 191) well-known agenda should then be rephrased by
replacing leap of faith with ‘despiteness’: unless we contribute how the ‘despiteness
of trust’ is possible, we miss the point of trust and explain anything but trust. Advan -
cing on this path may also enable distinguishing trust from naïveté, an issue that nei-
ther the cognitive nor the non-cognitive approaches address properly.
5. Conclusion
By introducing the oxytocin-related discoveries of the life sciences, the present paper
settled the debate between the ‘early learning’ theories and the ‘a priorists’. Trust is
a built-in, innate human faculty, not a capacity picked up as a result of early child-
hood experiences with the primary caregiver. The possibility to trust is inscribed in
the neurobiological system right from the start – humans are able to have the oxy-
tocin-based hormonal response since birth (or even earlier). To avoid falling into the
pitfall of reductionism, the paper rejected the idea of (biologically) determined trust
on the basis of Michael POLÁNYI’s (1966) principles of marginal control and bound-
ary conditions. Theorising trust, at least the upper (‘sentient’) levels of trusting
remains the task of the committed representatives of human and social sciences. The
present paper contributes to the challenge of a proper future conceptualisation of trust
by making the basics clear: metaphorically speaking, how deep the roots of trust dive
in the human being.
The general conclusion supports the initial assumption of the introduction: the
human is indeed a trusting being, below and at the same time above any early infant -
ile experience or lack of experience. The faculty and thus the possibility and oppor-
tunity to trust is always present. As for how we are able to truly ‘trigger’, actualise
this opportunity, that shall be the subject of a future article.
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